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Abstract. Although constitutions lay out the fundamental principles by which countries are

governed, identifying exactly which legal materials are considered constitutional is not a
straightforward task. This is for two reasons. First, there is no systematic evidence about the
relative importance of countries’ formal, written constitutions—the “Large-C” constitution—
versus their broader body of constitutional law derived from sources like judicial decisions,
treaties, and conventions—the “small-c” constitution. Second, it is often difficult to establish
which legal materials are definitively part of a country’s small-c constitution. We investigated the
nature and relative importance of small-c constitutional rights protections by fielding a global
expert survey to 220 experts from 123 countries. The results illustrate that although the Large-C
constitution is the primary source of constitutional rights in a majority of countries, the small-c
constitution also plays a significant role, especially in older constitutional systems. Perhaps
surprisingly, whether a country has a civil law or a common law tradition is only weakly associated
with the shape and form of the small-c constitution in most countries.
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1. INTRODUCTION
What is constitutional law? At first glance, the answer might seem obvious: it is the body
of law that relates to the constitution. But upon closer inspection, there can be remarkable
disagreement over exactly what makes certain legal materials constitutional. For instance, in the
United States, scholars are notoriously divided over whether the U.S. Supreme Court can update
the meaning of the written Constitution. They also are divided over whether some statutes, like
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have acquired constitutional status1 and whether conventions are a
source of constitutional law.2 Such disagreements over sources of constitutional law spill over into
disagreement over constitutional substance. As Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson describe the
U.S.: “[l]awyers, judges, political officials, and citizens disagree about whether women have a right
to an abortion; . . . whether affirmative action is permitted; . . . whether Congress’s commerce
power is effectively unlimited . . . ; whether independent agencies and other incursions on the
‘unitary’ executive are permitted; whether the modern administrative state is a wholesale
constitutional violation; and innumerable other fundamental questions.”3 Some U.S. scholars have
even gone as far as to suggest that constitutional law is not law, because there is no rule-ofrecognition that allows experts to identify which rules are constitutional ones.4
Of course, the U.S. may be unusual; after all, it does have a particularly old constitution
that is remarkably short and ambiguous by global standards.5 But similar questions arise around
the world. For example, are the constitutional interpretations by China’s National People’s
Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, a legislative body, part of Chinese constitutional law?6
Similarly, in Austria―what is the constitutional status of formally entrenched provisions in
ordinary law?7 In the United Kingdom, how should statutes―those deemed “constitutionally
significant” by courts and which can only be expressly repealed by parliament―be treated?
Likewise, how do we treat constitutional conventions in the U.K. that are politically binding but
not enforceable in court?8 And how should we evaluate treaties in the Netherlands, which are not
directly incorporated into the constitution but nonetheless form the basis for judicial review?9 As

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L. J. 1215, 1237-42 (2001) (explaining how the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is a super-statute due to its great principle, its adoption after an intense political struggle along with its
everlasting effect which has been well-entrenched, and its integration into federal laws).
1
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See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 136 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).

Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791,
1809-10 (2009).
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For a discussion, see id. at 1815-16.

See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1652-66 (2014)
[hereinafter Versteeg & Zackin, Exceptionalism].
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Tom Ginsburg & Yan Lin, Constitutional Interpretation in Law-Making: China’s Invisible Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism,
63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 (2015).
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MANFRED STELZER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 22 (2011).

See, e.g., NICK BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 85 (2012) (emphasizing the role of non-binding rules in the British
Constitution).
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See Gerhard van der Schyff, Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the Netherlands: A Bridge Too Far?, 11 GERMAN L. J. 275
(2010).
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these questions illustrate, determining the content of a country’s constitution is more complicated
than merely consulting a single document.
Given this complexity, the field of comparative constitutional law has only a limited
understanding of which legal materials comprise constitutional law in different countries. This
lack of agreement might bias different types of comparative analyses. To illustrate, a growing body
of quantitative (or Large-N) research uses the text of constitutions to make claims about a
constitution’s social and political foundations,10 historical trajectory,11 and the effectiveness of
particular constitutional provisions.12 The data for these studies are commonly drawn from the
Comparative Constitutions Project,13 but may include data from other datasets, such as the
Versteeg dataset on constitutional rights14 and a number of smaller-scale efforts.15 While these
empirical studies have become more common, they risk providing an incomplete picture—
especially for those jurisdictions where the importance of the written constitution is relatively
small.16 As another example, many studies focus on judicial decisions as their main source of
comparison.17 While such an approach might be appropriate for countries where most
constitutional law is developed through judicial interpretations,18 it runs the risk of
mischaracterizing jurisdictions where the constitution is given meaning through organic laws,
treaties, conventions, or legislative interpretations.
Evaluating the severity of these potential biases, however, requires better insights into what
comprises constitutional law in different systems. Assessing the extent of the shortcomings of
Large-N studies requires better knowledge on the relative importance of countries’ formal, written
constitutions—or, the “Large-C” constitution—versus the broader body of constitutional rules
See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, & Mila Versteeg, When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to
Resist in the World’s Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2013); Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of
Constitutional Rights, 39 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2015).
10

See, e.g., David S. Law & Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163 (2011);
ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
11

See, e.g., Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate & Steven C. Poe, Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Rights Abuse?, 71 J. POL.
644 (2009); Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 575 (2016); Adam
Chilton & Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (2015); Adam Chilton &
Mila Versteeg, Rights without Resources: The Impact of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending, 60 J. L. & ECON. 713 (2017).
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See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
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See Law & Versteeg, supra note 11; Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 10.

See, e.g., LINDA CAMP KEITH, POLITICAL REPRESSION: COURTS AND THE LAW (2011); Christian A. Davenport,
Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties Are
Suppressed, 58 J. POL. 627, 648 (1996); Avi Ben-Bassat & Momi Dahan, Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice, 36 J.
COMP. ECON. 103, 116-17 (2008); Jonathan Fox & Deborah Flores, Religions, Constitutions, and the State: A Cross-National
Study, 71 J. POL. 1499 (2009); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the
United States, 117 YALE L. J. 1236, 1238-40, 1252-56, 1287-88 (2007).
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See Vicki C. Jackson, Comment on Law and Versteeg, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2102, 2105-06 (2012).

This is the case for most textbooks in the field. See, e.g., VICKI JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (3d ed. 2014); NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2010); STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
(2014).
17

David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996) (“[W]hen people interpret
the Constitution, they rely not just on the text but also on the elaborate body of law that has developed, mostly through
judicial decisions, over the years.”).
18
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derived from sources such as judicial decisions, treaties, conventions, and super-statutes—or, the
“small-c” constitution.19 Similarly, evaluating the appropriateness of studying judicial decisions (or
other small-c sources), requires better knowledge regarding what legal sources make up the smallc constitution in any given country.
In this Article, we provide novel insights into these questions by presenting the result from
a global expert survey we administered from July 2017 to July 2020. We received responses from
220 constitutional law experts in 123 different countries. Among other things, the survey asked
experts to characterize the relative importance of the Large-C and small-c constitution and to
identify what legal materials comprise the small-c constitution in the area of constitutional rights.
In addition to asking a series of general questions on constitutional rights protection, it also asked
about the protection of twelve specific rights.
Our survey reveals a number of new findings about the relationship between Large-C and
small-c constitutional rights. First, we find that for the majority of countries in our sample, the
experts believe that the written constitution is the main source of constitutional rights. Notably,
in 62% of the countries, experts believe that the Large-C constitution is the “exclusive” or
“primary” source for constitutional rights. Experts for another 35% of the countries believe that
constitutional rights were protected through a “mixed” regime comprised of both the Large-C
constitution and small-c sources. In only 3% of the countries, experts believe that rights were
“exclusively” or “primarily” protected in the small-c constitution. We also find that the relative
importance of small-c constitutional sources increases with constitutional age. That is, experts
assigned a larger role to the small-c constitution in countries with older Large-C constitutions.
Second, we find that judicial interpretations are the most common legal basis for small-c
constitutional rights. Experts for a little less than half (48%) of the countries identify judicial
decisions as a legal basis of constitutional rights. Yet, our survey also revealed that there are other
common legal bases of small-c constitutional rights. Experts reported that: treaties are a legal basis
of constitutional rights in 34% of the countries; constitutional conventions are a legal basis of
constitutional rights in 26% of the countries; laws with quasi-constitutional status are a legal basis
of constitutional rights in 25% of the countries; and common law precedents are a legal basis of
constitutional rights in 8% of the countries. Perhaps surprisingly, whether a country is has a
common law or civil law tradition has only limited impact on the relative importance of these
small-c sources. Instead, judicial interpretations of constitutional texts are just as prevalent a legal
basis for small-c constitutional rights in common law systems as they are in civil law systems. The
same is true for constitutional conventions and laws with quasi-constitutional status. The only
exceptions are treaties and common law precedents; civil law systems are more likely to recognize
treaties as a basis of constitutional rights, while common law systems are more likely to recognize
common law precedents as a basis for constitutional rights. Overall, however, the role of the
common law-civil law divide is surprisingly small. Instead, we again find that the main predictor
See David S. Law, Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 376, 377 (Peter Cane &
Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010) (“A Large-C constitution is a legal document, or set of legal documents, that (1) proclaims
its own status as supreme or fundamental law, (2) purports to dictate the structure, contours, and powers of the state, and
(3) may also be formally entrenched, in the sense of being harder to amend or repeal than other laws. A small-c constitution,
by contrast, consists of the body of rules, practices, and understandings, written or unwritten, that actually determines who
holds what kind of power, under what conditions, and subject to what limits.”); see also ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE
ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 39 (2009) (“A more subtle, but still parallel, labeling approach is to use the
“big-C” and “small-c” versions of the word, in which the proper noun Constitution is reserved for the text and the lowercase spelling refers to the broader constitutional order.”) (citation omitted).
19
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for the prevalence of these small-c sources is the age of the constitution: the older the
constitutional order, judicial interpretations, conventions, super-statutes, and common law
precedents (though not treaties) are more likely to be a source of rights.
Third, for the countries where multiple experts took the survey, there is substantial
agreement amongst those experts, but the agreement is, of course, not complete. For example, for
most of the countries, most of the experts agreed that the Large-C constitution itself has a
substantial role to play, but there is expert disagreement over whether, and to what extent, the
Large-C constitution is supplemented by small-c constitutional sources. But despite there being
some disagreement among the experts, it appears that constitutional law is not so indeterminate
that experts cannot agree at all. Having said that, the country where expert disagreement is largest
is the United States, where experts are unable to agree over whether the written constitution has
any role to play. This finding further solidifies the status of the U.S. as a constitutional outlier.20
Before continuing, it is important to note that we designed our survey with two objectives
in mind. Our primary objective was to provide insights into the overall nature and importance of
small-c constitutions, based on expert characterizations of the nature of constitutional rights
protection in general. It is our hope that the findings related to this objective can help better guide
future comparative analyses of all kinds. Our secondary objective was to evaluate the
methodological challenges involved in coding small-c constitutions. While existing Large-N
studies have exclusively analyzed Large-C constitutions, the extension of these methods to smallc constitutions is an obvious next step for this growing field. Our survey can be viewed as a first
attempt to code small-c constitutions, by requesting that experts characterize the constitutional
order in general, and by inquiring whether and how twelve specific rights were protected in the
small-c constitution. The study thus produces data on whether twelve specific rights are protected
in the small-c constitution. However, our study has limitations: it only covers a handful of rights,
is not comprehensive in its country coverage, and does not have multiple experts for every
country. Yet, our approach could potentially be extended to additional areas of constitutional law,
countries, and experts. It can therefore be viewed as a “pilot” for coding small-c constitutions that
also allows us to identify and evaluate methodological challenges.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part 2 conceptualizes the problems
associated with identifying constitutional law across national jurisdictions. It suggests that there
are at least three different approaches for doing so, each of which could yield different answers
on the scope of countries’ constitutional laws. Part 3 introduces the survey we administered to
constitutional law experts from around the world. Part 4 details the results of the survey, exploring
the relative importance of the Large-C and small-c constitution (Part 4.A); the nature of the legal
materials that comprise the small-c constitution (Part 4.B); the nature of constitutional protections
for twelve different rights (Part 4.C); and the extent of expert agreement on these questions (Part
4.D). Part 5 concludes by reflecting upon whether our approach could be extended to more
systematic coding of small-c constitutions.

20

See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the U.S. Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762 (2012).
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2. IDENTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
2.1. Identifying Large-C Constitutions
It is relatively easy to identify most countries’ written, Large-C, constitutions. Virtually all
countries have promulgated a document that they designate to be their “Constitution.” These
documents tend to share important similarities: they set out the basic functions of the government,
separate powers, and grant rights to citizens. Moreover, they are typically more difficult to amend
than ordinary laws, which signifies and entrenches their status as higher law.21 In addition, most
countries empower the judiciary to invalidate legislation and acts that contradict the constitution.22
Of course, not all countries fit this mold: a handful of countries lack a designated
constitutional document (e.g., Israel and the United Kingdom); a few countries have constitutional
texts that are not entrenched (e.g., New Zealand’s Constitution Act of 1986); and some countries
do not grant courts the power of judicial review (e.g., the Netherlands23). But despite these
exceptions, true disagreements over a country’s Large-C constitution are fairly minor.
Given the rarity of these exceptions, systematic efforts to analyze constitutions have
mostly examined the documents that countries designate as their constitution. Indeed, both the
Comparative Constitutions Project and Versteeg’s dataset on constitutional rights use the
constitutional label as guiding principle for which documents to include and code.24 This
admittedly results in including a few odd documents, but most comparativists agree that treating
these documents as constitutions is justified because scholars should not bring a preconceived
notion of what qualifies as a constitution to the study of foreign legal systems. In the handful of
cases where there is no formally designated constitution, scholars have typically treated the texts
that govern functionally constitutional matters, such as separation of powers and rights, as
constitutions.25 Overall, when identifying Large-C constitutions, the universe of instances where
there is any disagreement is minor.
2.2 Identifying small-c Constitutions
Systematically identifying what is considered part of a country’s small-c constitution is not
as easy. Imagine that someone wanted to identify—and perhaps even quantify—all of the world’s
small-c constitutions for a particular area of constitutional law, such as free speech. The most
obvious starting point for such an inquiry may be to study judicial interpretations of constitutional
free speech provisions. Indeed, some existing projects have done exactly that. For example, the
National Science Foundation (NSF) funded “Free Speech Repository” compiles free speech
jurisprudence from a wide range of courts from around the world, and then codes different aspects

21

See Donald S. Lutz, Toward A Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1994).

See Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 30 J. L. ECON & ORG 587, 587 (2014)
(reporting that 83% of countries had judicial review in 2011).
22

23

Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands), art. 120 (1983).

24

See Law & Versteeg, supra note 11, at 1188.

Examples of such functionally defined constitutional documents include Israel’s Basic Laws and the United Kingdom’s
1998 Human Rights Act.
25
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of these decisions.26 But while coding judicial decisions may be a convenient starting point, even
a major effort to code them would provide a woefully incomplete picture of the full scope of many
countries’ treatment of the right to free speech in their small-c constitutions.
Unfortunately, there is not a single, obvious way to identify constitutional sources across
countries. Instead, there are at least three possible approaches for doing so, and each approach
would yield different findings about the nature of small-c constitutions. These three approaches
are: (A) an essential approach, which emphasizes constitutional entrenchment; (B) an external
approach, which emphasizes exogenously defined core constitutional functions; and (C) a nominal
approach, which emphasizes local understandings of the constitution and constitutional law.
A. The Essential Approach. One approach to identifying small-c constitutions would be to
rely on what may be the essential and defining feature of constitutions: legal entrenchment.
Entrenchment, or the ability to create “temporally extended commitments,”27 is widely seen as a
defining feature and central goal of constitutions.28 By entrenching commitments, constitutions
serve as a mechanism for overcoming the inconsistency of preferences over time29 and are a way
to make legal and political commitments credible.30 Entrenchment can occur through the erection
of formal barriers to amendment, as well as through establishing political practices that render
constitutional law arduous to change in practice.31
Using entrenchment as the criteria to establish which laws are constitutional requires
identifying laws that are difficult to change. This includes laws that are formally entrenched
through heightened amendment rules. For instance, the Austrian legislature can enact entrenched
statutes as “Federal Constitutional Acts,” which are passed by a two-third majority and can only
be changed by the same super-majority.32 The Austrian legislature is also able to insert entrenched
See Thomas M. Keck, A Qualitative and Multi-Method Approach to Collecting and Sharing Data on Constitutional Courts (Nat’l
Sci. Found., Working Paper Award No. 1535250, 2017). See Thomas M. Keck, Free Speech Repository, SYRACUSE U.,
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/deans/Free_Speech_Repository/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2019).
26

27

See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM IN TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 73 (2008).

See Wil Waluchow, Constitutionalism, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/ (last
updated Dec. 20, 2017); Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399 (2008); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment,
124 HARV. L. REV. 657 (2011); Lawrence Alexander, Constitutionalism (U. San Diego, Research Paper No. 07-04, 2005)
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 132-78 (1995). This
discussion of entrenchment builds on Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Un-entrenched: Towards an Alternative Theory
of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657 (2015).
28

29

See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 258 (1999).

See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice
in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001).
30

See Versteeg & Zackin, Constitutions Un-entrenched, supra note 28, at 659. For a comprehensive treatment of formal
amendment rules, see RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: MAKING, BREAKING, AND CHANGING
CONSTITUTIONS (2019). Regarding de facto entrenchment, see Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional
Amendment Rule Matter at All?: Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L.
686 (2015).
31

See e.g., MEDIENKOOPERATION UND MEDIENFÖRDERUNG [Federal Constitutional Act on Media Cooperation and
Media Funding] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 125/2011 (Austria); BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ ÜBER DIE
NACHHALTIGKEIT, DEN TIERSCHUTZ, DEN UMFASSENDEN UMWELTSCHUTZ, DIE SICHERSTELLUNG DER WASSER- UND
LEBENSMITTELVERSORGUNG UND DIE FORSCHUNG [Federal Constitutional Act on Sustainability, Animal Protection,
32
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provisions into ordinary statutes.33 Similarly, in Israel, some Basic Laws are entrenched while
others are not, which has spurred debate among Israeli scholars over whether this distinction
affects their constitutional status.34 A more difficult question is whether laws are constitutional
when they are entrenched de facto. William Eskridge and John Fehrejohn argue that in the U.S.,
some federal statutes have acquired the status of “super-statutes” because they have become
“stuck” in the public culture and are unlikely to be legislatively repealed or overturned by the
Supreme Court.35 As another example, courts in the U.K. have held that some statutes are
constitutionally significant and therefore can only be expressly repealed by parliament (as opposed
to “implied repeal,” whereby a later conflicting statute takes precedence over an earlier statute).36
While de facto entrenchment is harder to identify, an essential approach would likely treat such
statutes as constitutional.
Under the essential approach, constitutional interpretations by a country’s highest court
can also be part of the small-c constitution. Specifically, where court decisions have the force of
stare decisis (typically in common law countries), these decisions are harder to overturn, which
effectively entrenches them.37 And even when the decisions of the highest courts do not have the
force of stare decisis, they are entrenched de facto when they are widely followed and not
overturned in practice.
Likewise, treaties can become part of the small-c constitution when they are entrenched.
This is most clearly the case when they are formally incorporated into the constitution.38 For
instance, a growing number of constitutions specifically incorporate human rights treaties.39 In
other countries, courts have deemed certain treaties to be part of the constitutional order. For
example, a number of Latin American courts have regarded certain treaties as part of what they
refer to as the “the block of constitutionality.”40 If court decisions are entrenched, then so are
treaties that were given constitutional status through judicial interpretations.
Comprehensive Environmental Protection, Water and Food Security, and Research] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No.
111/2013 (Austria).
One example of an entrenched provision in an ordinary statute can be found in the Parteiengesetz 2012 [PartG] [Political
Parties Act 2012] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 56/2012.
33

See, e.g., Martin Edelman, The Status of the Israeli Constitution at the Present Time, 21 SHOFAR: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES 1, 12 (2003).
34

See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 1, at 1229-30; Levinson, supra note 28, at 701. Statutes like the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Administrative Procedure Act are often described in such terms. MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET,
ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 38 (2002); Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to Identify the Complete
Constitution: Lessons From an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 628 (2006); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution
Outside the Constitution, 114 YALE L. J. 408, 457 (2007).
35

See Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) (18 February 2002); BH & Anor v The Lord
Advocate & Anor (Scotland) [2012] UKSC 24 (20 June 2012).
36

See James F. Spriggs & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091,
1092 (2001); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 40, 79 (2010).
37

Without explicitly being given constitutional status, treaties are rarely entrenched. In fact, withdrawal is typically the
executive’s prerogative even when ratification occurred through parliamentary involvement.
38

See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 93 (Colombia); CONSTITUCIÓN NACIÓNAL [CONST. NAC.]
art. 75, para. 22 (Arg.).
39

Manuel Eduardo Gongora-Mera, The Block of Constitutionality as the Doctrinal Pivot of a lus Commune in TRANSFORMATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 235, 236-40, 243 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2017).
40
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Another possible source of constitutional law under the essential approach are
“constitutional conventions”; that is, “certain rules of constitutional behaviour which are
considered to be binding on those who operate the Constitution, but which are not enforced by
the law courts.”41 Writing about Britain, Albert Venn Dicey characterized these conventions as
“constitutional morality,”42 enforced through popular opinion rather than the courts.43 While not
justiciable, such conventions are entrenched; violating them, according to Dicey, would amount
to an act of revolution.44 Constitutional conventions are not unique to Britain; in the United States,
many legal commentators have recognized their existence.45 Examples include the longstanding
practice (constitutionalized in the Twenty-second Amendment in 1951) that the President may
serve no more than two terms46 and the independence of the Federal Reserve.47 Some scholars of
the U.S. Constitution have even suggested that some conventions are judicially enforced, and
perhaps even more constitutionally salient than those described by Dicey.48 While less is known
about conventions comparatively, many countries’ small-c constitutions may also include
conventions, whether justiciable or not.49
Yet even if scholars agreed that entrenchment is a defining feature of constitutions that
should guide comparative inquiries, there is not an obviously feasible way of identifying
entrenched legal materials across jurisdictions. Regarding statutes, the difficulty lies in statutes that
have effectively obtained constitutional status but are not formally entrenched. Moreover, merely
looking at the extent to which such statutes are amended is unlikely to capture their status as
super-statutes. For example, the False Weather Reports Act (18 U.S.C. § 2074) has remained
largely un-amended, but it is hardly due to status as a super-statue. Yet any other objective criteria
to reliably identify super-statutes is not obvious.
For judicial interpretations, likewise, it is not always easy to establish whether they are
entrenched. When both higher and lower courts interpret the constitution, it would be necessary
to decide whether the lower court interpretations are sufficiently entrenched to be part of the
small-c constitution. Additionally, some decisions may be overturned more quickly than others.
To illustrate, while there is no doubt that U.S. Supreme Court decisions set precedent, U.S.
constitutional law has also witnessed episodes of dramatic constitutional change, such as the New
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Deal “switch in time.”50 Such episodes make it difficult to categorically treat judicial decisions as
entrenched. And if judicial decisions are not entrenched, the same thing could be true of treaties
that were elevated to constitutional law through judicial interpretations.
For constitutional conventions, similar problems exist. When entrenchment is the sole
criterion for coding conventions, this easily takes us outside the realm of constitutional law. To
illustrate, most would agree that it is a convention for the U.S. government to light fireworks on
the 4th of July in Washington, D.C.; yet, few would agree that this practice is constitutionally
mandated. Thus, it is hard to determine which conventions are constitutional ones without further
substantive criteria. Another option is to count as constitutional only those conventions that seem
to be followed out of a sense of legal obligation. This appears to be the approach of scholars who
characterize some constitutional conventions as “historical gloss”; that is, conventions which the
judicial branch defers to and enforces, thus giving those conventions a legal character.51 Yet, as
international lawyers know, determining which customs are legally binding international law
because they are followed from “a sense of legal obligation” is notoriously difficult.52 Identifying
constitutional conventions thus raises a set of difficult questions that are not easily resolved by
reference to entrenchment alone.
B. The External Approach. Another approach to identifying small-c constitutions would be
to externally define certain functions as constitutional. The central idea here is that, at their
essence, constitutions and constitutional law perform a set of standard functions and that legal
materials that fit this definition are therefore constitutional. While there is no single list of these
standard functions, most constitutional scholars would likely agree that stipulating the basic
structure of government and defining individual rights fall within the realm of constitutional law.53
While the essential approach requires identifying legal materials that are entrenched, an
external approach requires identifying substantive areas that are functionally constitutional. To
illustrate, if one were to decide that the abolition of the death penalty is a constitutional issue, one
could study when and how countries legally abolished it. One would find that in many countries,
this is done in the constitution (e.g., Colombia54), while in others, this is done by a statute (e.g.,
New Zealand55), treaty (e.g., Benin56), or court decision interpreting the constitution (e.g., South
50
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See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 418.
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Africa57). The point is that if one assumes that abolition is part of constitutional law, all of these
countries have used constitutional law to abolish the death penalty.
One example of a data collection effort that takes the external approach to identifying and
quantifying the small-c constitution is a project by Pierre Verdier and Mila Versteeg on how
countries deal with international law in their domestic legal orders.58 The project collects over fifty
variables relating to treaty-making and the reception of treaties and customary international law in
the domestic legal order. To collect this information, they rely on a variety of legal sources that
deal with these issues, including case law and executive and administrative documents. Their
project reveals important cross-national differences in the legal basis for these issues. For example,
they find that in most current and former commonwealth countries, courts typically decide
whether international law applies directly in the domestic legal order,59 but in Eastern European
countries, laws that implement the constitution decide the same issue.60 The project further reveals
that, increasingly, constitutional texts directly address the status of ratified treaties, which confirms
observations in the literature that constitutions have grown more specific.61
The main downside of the external approach is that it might designate issues as
constitutional that are not considered constitutional by the scholars and practitioners in a given
country. For example, if we decided that the right to healthcare is constitutional in nature, an
external approach would classify the legal materials that provide access to healthcare as
constitutional, even when some of these materials might not be considered constitutional in the
country itself. In the U.S., different laws—including the Social Security Amendments of 1965,62
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act63—arguably provide a limited right of access to affordable health care and to essential medical
treatment. The external approach thus might conclude that a right to healthcare exists in U.S.
constitutional law.64 Yet nearly all American constitutional law scholars, practitioners, and citizens
would likely object to that conclusion because those laws are not in the U.S. Constitution (nor are
they super-statute for that matter, as witnessed by the continued efforts to repeal the Affordable
Care Act). While the external approach might be useful for some inquiries, the fact that the same
issue might be considered constitutional in some countries and not in others makes it less useful
for understanding the nature of constitutional law across national jurisdictions.
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C. The Nominal Approach. A third approach to identifying small-c constitutions would be to
accept the premise that there is no uniform definition of what constitutes constitutional law that
works across countries.65 It would therefore emphasize local understandings: what matters is what
the relevant polity believes to be constitutional law.
A nominal approach thus identifies small-c constitutions based on what local experts
believe to be constitutional law. It differs from the essential approach in that it would only include
entrenched legal materials when local experts treat them as constitutional (and conversely, might
include materials that are not entrenched, but are nonetheless are considered to be constitutional
in nature). It differs from the external approach in that substantive issues that may seem
functionally constitutional to an outsider are only treated as constitutional when local experts treat
them as such. Of course, it may be the case that in some countries, local experts identify legal
materials as constitutional because they are entrenched (as in the essential approach) or because
they deal with certain functions (as with the external approach). But the point is that this can differ
from country to country. It is for this reason that the nominal approach treats local understandings
as the only valid way to identify a constitution.
Because the nominal approach does not require a preconceived notion of constitutional
law, it may reveal new constitutional sources that are not widely recognized in the literature. For,
example, when responding to our survey experts reported that: customary law is a source of
constitutional law in Malawi; judicial interpretations of ordinary statutes are a source of
constitutional law in Japan;66 customary international law is a source of constitutional law in
Colombia;67 the Venezuelan constitution has an open human rights clause that allows courts to
bring in natural law-like principles;68 a statutory bill of rights is a source of constitutional law in
Norway;69 the Czech “constitutional order” includes all sources of law that deal with functionally
constitutional matters, such as the 1991 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and
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Versteeg & Zackin, Exceptionalism, supra note 5, at 1652.
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legislation dealing with elections, political parties, and the constitutional court;70 and because the
Saudi Basic Law stipulates that it upholds and enforces the Quran and the Sunnahs, these religious
texts are a primary source of small-c constitutional rights in Saudi Arabia.71
Additionally, in some countries, parts of prior constitutions may retain constitutional
status. For example, when the French Constitutional Council declared the preamble of the 1958
Constitution justiciable, it also made the preamble of the 1946 Constitution and the 1789 French
Declaration of the Rights of Man part of French constitutional law (the “bloc de constitutionnalite”), since
the 1958 preamble refers to these documents.72 Thus, the nominal approach to identifying the smallc constitution can reveal a variety of constitutional sources, some of which are not well-recognized
in the often Anglo-American-oriented comparative constitutional law literature.
While the nominal approach has great potential to enhance our understanding of the
nature of constitutional law around the world, its main downside is that it less useful for anyone
interested in substantive areas of constitutional law. For example, if a researcher is interested in
knowing whether the death penalty is unconstitutional in different countries, knowing that
Colombia, New Zealand, Benin, and South Africa all abolished the death penalty would not be
enough. The researcher would also have to have detailed knowledge of whether things like the
abolishing statute in New Zealand or the abolishing treaty in Benin are considered constitutional
sources of law in those countries.
Another downside of this approach is that if experts do not agree, it might simply be
impossible to identify a country’s small-c constitution. One possible reason for disagreement is
that different experts within a country might use different approaches to identifying constitutional
law; some might rely on some external definition, others might use the essentialist approach, and
yet others might have a different understanding entirely. Another reason might be that courts and
other interpreters fail to interpret the constitution in a coherent or systematic manner and the
constitution is routinely used to serve political objectives. That said, a finding that experts fail to
agree on the nature of constitutional law would be interesting in its own right, as it would mean
that constitutional law lacks a rule of recognition that allows officials to consistently agree on what
70

The expert described the Czech constitutional order as follows:
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the constitution mandates. Ultimately, how common it is for there to be no consensus on the
content of constitutional law is an empirical question on which there is currently little evidence.
For instance, while the profound disagreement over the nature of U.S. constitutional law may
suggest that disagreement is common, the U.S. is unique for its remarkably brief text and its
relatively infrequent resort to formal amendments.73
Indeed, one research project—the CONREASON project by András Jakab, Arthur
Dyevre, and Giulio Itzcovich74—gives some cause for optimism. The CONREASON project
involved asking scholars from 40 countries to identify their country’s most significant
constitutional law decisions and to answer a standardized set of questions on the reasoning styles
of judges. When it came to identifying decisions, multiple experts were asked to evaluate each
other’s choices. Jakab and his co-authors found that there was remarkable agreement amongst the
experts: in only 6% of all cases did three or more experts disagree with each other.75 The
experiences from the CONREASON project suggest that the indeterminacy of constitutional law
might not be an insurmountable obstacle for the nominal approach.
3. GLOBAL EXPERT SURVEY
Our expert survey is based on the nominal approach. We opted for this approach because
we are interested in the nature of small-c constitutions across different jurisdictions, and we
believe that one can only explore this without a preconceived notion of what constitutional law is
or should be, as with the essential and external approaches. This does not mean that the other
approaches are not valid for other inquiries. For instance, the essential approach may appeal to
researchers studying entrenchment, while the external approach may appeal to researchers
studying a particular area of constitutional law that they deem functionally constitutional. But, for
our effort to explore the role that small-c constitutions play in as many jurisdictions as possible,
the nominal approach is the most promising.
While the nominal approach could be applied to any area of constitutional law, we limit
our inquiry to rights. We do so because focusing on one specific area improves the chances that
experts have the same substantive constitutional rules in mind when answering our questions. We
also believe there are two reasons that constitutional rights are a particularly appropriate focus for
an initial inquiry. First, the scope of rights usually cannot be inferred from the written
constitutional text alone, which means it is a good area to discover the range of other sources that
supplement the Large-C constitution. Second, rights are an area of constitutional law that most
constitutional law experts have some familiarity with, which enlarges the pool of possible experts
we can draw from. Of course, the trade-off of focusing on rights is that our findings may not
generalize to other areas of constitutional law.
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3.2. Expert Recruitment
Figure 1: Distribution of Responses by Country

We recruited experts for our survey in three ways. First, we posted information about the
survey on the prominent “I-CONnect” Blog.76 Second, we recruited participants from the
University of Chicago Law School’s Summer Institute in Law & Economics. The Summer
Institute attracts professors, judges, prominent practitioners, and graduate students from around
the world to spend two weeks studying law and economics.77 We sent a request to past participants
from the institute to participate in the survey if they felt they had expertise on constitutional rights
in their country. Third, we directly emailed experts and asked them to participate in the survey.
These were either experts that were our own existing professional contacts or experts identified
by our graduate students. We did not offer experts payment, but offered to acknowledge their
expertise on our website, www.constitutions.org.
Through these processes, we recruited 220 experts for 123 different countries to complete
our survey. We received 1 expert response for 73 countries, 2 responses for 31 countries, 3
responses for 8 countries, 4 responses for 6 countries, and 5 or more responses for 5 countries.
Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the experts that participated in our survey.
Appendix 3 provides a list of all the experts that contributed to our study (although it omits experts
who requested to keep their identity confidential).78 We should note that we gave experts the
option to skip questions they did not feel comfortable answering, so not all of the questions have
Our post can be seen at Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Global Survey for Constitutional Law Experts on Small-c Constitutions,
I-CONNECT (July 17, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/07/global-survey-for-constitutional-law-experts-onsmall-c-constitutions/.
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We asked experts to provide their name and institutional affiliation, but gave them the option to either remain
anonymous or be listed as an expert that contributed to the project. Out of the experts that completed the survey, 19
requested to remain anonymous. Appendix 3 lists the name and affiliations respondents that chose to be listed as an expert
contributor to the project.
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220 responses. The median amount of time that respondents spent on the survey was 24 minutes
(there were significant outliers, however, for respondents that started the survey and then
completed it a day or two later).
Despite spending three years trying to recruit participants from every country in the world,
we simply were unable to recruit experts from 71 of the world’s 194 widely recognized countries.
Admittedly, these countries are not random. Instead, they are countries that have dramatically
smaller populations and economies than the 123 countries for which we have responses. For
instance, the 71 countries for which we do not have experts only comprise roughly 11% of the
world’s population and 5% of the world’s GDP.79 These countries also likely have weaker
constitutional traditions. That said, because our sample is incomplete and non-random, we
recognize the need to be careful in making universal statements about the role of small-c
constitutions in rights protection.
3.2. Survey Design
Our survey had two main parts.80 The first part of the survey asked about the nature of
the small-c constitution in the area of rights in general, and the second part asked about twelve
specific rights. In the first part, we began by asking experts about the primary legal source of
constitutional rights in their country. Specifically, we asked, “What is the legal source of
constitutional rights in [your country]?” and to answer “on a scale from 1 (exclusively the ‘LargeC’ constitution) to 5 (exclusively the ‘small-c’ constitution).” We provided an explanation of these
terms in an introduction to the survey. The answer choices were as follows:81
1. Exclusively the Large-C Constitution
The rights that are considered constitutional are exclusively enumerated in the
written constitution.
2. Primarily the Large-C Constitution
The rights that are considered constitutional are primarily enumerated in the
written constitution—but there are exceptions.
3. A Mix of Large-C Constitution and small-c Constitution
The rights that are considered constitutional are found roughly equally in the
written constitution and the larger body of constitutional law comprised of sources
like judicial interpretations, laws with quasi-constitutional status (“super statutes”),
treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution, or conventions.

These estimates are based on calculations using 2010 data with the variables “pop” and “rgdpe” from the Penn World
Tables. Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, & Marcel P. Timmer, The Next Generation of the Penn World Table, 105 AM.
ECON. REV. 3150 (2015).
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We developed these categories in consultation with leading constitutional law experts from around the world. We
particularly thank Rosalind Dixon and Ran Hirschl for their feedback.
81
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4. Primarily the small-c Constitution
The rights that are considered constitutional are primarily found in the larger body
of constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with
quasi-constitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated
into the constitution, or conventions—but there are exceptions.
5. Exclusively the small-c Constitution
The rights that are considered constitutional are exclusively found in the larger
body of constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws
with quasi-constitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been
incorporated into the constitution, or conventions.
Next, we asked those experts that did not select “Exclusively the Large-C Constitution”
to identify what are the primary legal bases for the rights in their small-c constitution. Here, we
provided the following six options:
1. Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees
2. Common law precedents
3. Laws with quasi-constitutional status (super statutes or laws that implement
constitutional guarantees)
4. Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution
5. Conventions
6. Other, please specify
We provided the first five options because they have all been singled out as important
bases for rights in comparative literature. The sixth option was provided to acknowledge that
different systems may include other sources not captured here. Moreover, because the larger body
of constitutional law in any given country may be comprised of multiple sources, respondents
were given the option to select more than one answer to this question. For each of the answers
that the experts selected, we also asked whether they believed that the majority of experts in their
country would agree with them. We did so because this offers one way to gauge perceived
agreement on particular small-c sources.
After these general questions, the second part of the survey asked respondents a set of
standard questions for twelve specific constitutional rights: (1) freedom of speech; (2) prohibition
of torture; (3) freedom of movement; (4) right to education; (5) right to housing; (6) right to social
security; (7) right to healthcare; (8) freedom of religion; (9) freedom of association; (10) gender
equality; (11) right to unionize; (12) right to establish political parties. We selected these rights
because they represent a good mix of civil, political rights, and social rights (or first- and secondgeneration rights), as well as a mix of individual and organizational rights (a distinction that we
develop in our own prior work).82
For each right, we first gave an example of a typical constitutional provision enshrining
the right. We then asked the experts “What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to
[specific right] in [your country]?”, whereby we gave the following options:
82
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1. The Right is in the Large-C Constitution
This constitutional right is the written constitution.
2. The Right is not in the Large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution
This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions.
3. Not Applicable
There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country].
4. I Don't Know
I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right.
We next asked those experts who believed that the right could be found in the small-c
constitution to identify the legal bases for the right (we gave the same six options as our questions
on legal bases from the first part of the survey: judicial interpretations; common law precedents;
laws with quasi-constitutional status; treaties; conventions; and other). We did not ask the same
question for those who answered that a right was protected in the Large-C constitution, based on
the assumption that when a right is explicitly enumerated, the Large-C constitution is the main
legal basis for that right.83
4. RESULTS
4.1. Legal Source of Constitutional Rights
One notable finding from our survey is that most experts believe that constitutional rights
are exclusively or primarily found in the Large-C constitution. Panel A of Table 1 reveals that 36%
of experts located rights “exclusively” in the Large-C constitution, while 32% of respondents
located them “primarily” in the Large-C constitution. Combined, this means that roughly twothirds of experts believe that the written constitution is the exclusive or primary source of
constitutional rights. Another 28% of experts indicated that constitutional rights were protected
through a mixed regime of Large-C and small-c sources. Only about 5% of experts believe that
constitutional rights are “primarily” or “exclusively” found in the small-c constitution: 5 experts
indicated that rights were found “primarily” in the small-c constitution (these experts answered
the survey for Australia, Israel, the U.K., and the U.S. (2x)) and another 5 indicated that they were
That assumption might be challenged however, and in hindsight, we possibly should have given respondents an option
to identify additional legal bases for the right. At the same time, we were worried that doing so might introduce confusion
about what we are most interested. The purpose of our survey was to understand the main legal source of protection for
the right, not the basis for understanding its exact contours. For each of the twelve rights, we also asked several other
questions. First, to get a sense of expert agreement, we asked whether they think most constitutional lawyers in their
country would regard the right to be constitutionally protected. Second, we asked for the expert to identify, if possible, the
year that the right was first protected. Third, we asked whether there was anything else the expert would like to share about
the small-c basis for the right, and if, so, to provide a narrative answer. Fourth, we asked whether the expert believed that
the government generally respected the right in practice. And fifth, we asked whether courts have enforced the right, based
on either the Large-C constitution or small-c constitution.
83
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found “exclusively” in the small-c constitution (these experts answered the survey for Brunei,
New Zealand, the U.K. (2x), and the U.S.).
Table 1: Source of Constitutional Rights
A. By Expert
B. By Country
#
%
#
%
Exclusively Large-C
77
36.2
75
62.0
Primarily Large-C
67
31.5
Mix
59
27.7
42
34.7
Primarily small-c
5
2.4
4
3.3
Exclusively small-c
5
2.4
Panel B of Table 1 report these results aggregated at the country level and Figure 2 depicts
these categories on a world map. Because the difference between “exclusively” and “primarily” is
somewhat subjective, we group these same results in three buckets: (1) Large-C countries, where
constitutional rights are “exclusively” or “primarily” found in the Large-C constitution; (2) mixed
regime countries, where constitutional rights are found in both and Large-C and small-c sources; and
(3) small-c countries, where constitutional rights are “exclusively” or “primarily” found in the smallc constitution. When grouping countries, we address expert disagreement as follows: countries are
categorized as Large-C if all the experts for a country said constitutional rights were “exclusively”
or “primarily” Large-C and as small-c if all the experts for a country said constitutional rights were
“exclusively” or “primarily” small-c. All other countries are categorized as mixed-regimes.
Notably, this results in more countries’ being classified as mixed regimes than when the data was
aggregated at the expert level. (Part 4.4. explores the extent of expert disagreement in more detail.)
Using this grouping, there are 75 countries classified as Large-C regimes, 42 countries classified as
mixed-regimes, and 4 countries classified as small-c regimes (those three are Australia, Brunei,
New Zealand, and the U.K.).
Figure 2: Source of Constitutional Rights by Country
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We also investigate whether several constitutional and legal variables are associated with
the relative importance of the Large-C constitution.84 Specifically, we investigate the relationship
between having a Large-C constitutional system and three variables that capture features of a
country’s constitutional system—(1) the age of the constitution, 85 (2) the extent to which a
constitution has witnessed infrequent amendment, or is entrenched as measured by its
“entrenchment score,”86 and (3) the length of the constitution as measured by its word count87—
and four variables that capture features of countries’ broader legal systems—(4) if they are
common law systems,88 (5) the level of respect for the rule of law,89 (6) the level of judicial
independence,90 and (7) the level of democratization.91
Of these seven features of countries’ constitutional and legal systems, we find that the only
one with a statistically significant association with constitutional regime type is the age of the
constitution. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship by plotting the age of the constitution for LargeC countries and mixed/small-c countries (we combined small-c countries with mixed countries
because there are only 4 small-c countries). Figure 3 reveals that every constitution which has been
around for at least a century is a mixed regime. By contrast, for younger constitutions, there is no
clear pattern in regime classifications. This finding reflects, perhaps unsurprisingly, that building
a constitutional order comprised of multiple constitutional sources takes time.

Appendix 1 provides complete regression results for all seven of these variables; in the text, however, we present our
results graphically to make them easier to interpret by a wide audience of constitutional law scholars and we focus on
highlighting the more interesting aspects of the results.
84

85

Data on the age of the constitution was created based on the timeline from the Comparative Constitutions Project.

To measure amendment rates, we used the entrenchment score created by Versteeg & Zackin, Constitutions Un-entrenched,
supra note 28, at 661. The entrenchment score captures “the total number of years a democratic polity has existed divided
by the total number of years in which it witnessed constitutional change (either through replacement or amendment).” Id.
at 661.
86

To measure the length of the constitution, we used word count data, which Versteeg and Zackin describe as “specificity.”
Versteeg & Zackin, Constitutions Un-entrenched, supra note 28, at 661.
87

Data on whether a country is a common law system was taken from Rafeal La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). We define common law countries as
those identified by La Porta et al. as having British common law traditions, and civil law countries as those identified by
La Porta et al. as having French, German, or Nordic civil law traditions.
88

89

Data on the rule of law was taken from the World Justice Project, http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/ (2019).

Data on judicial independence was taken from Drew Linzer & Jeffrey K. Staton, A Global Measure of Judicial Independence,
1948-2012, 3 J. L. & CTS. 223 (2015).
90

Data on democracy was taken from the Polity IV project, Monty G. Marshall et al., State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars
and Failures of Governance, 1955-2009, Dataset and Coding Guidelines, POL. INSTABILITY TASK FORCE (Apr. 29, 2009).
91
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Figure 3: Age of Constitution and Constitution Regime Type

The two other features of countries’ constitutional systems we examined do not appear to
have a statistically significant association with particular constitutional regime types. It would be
reasonable to think that frequent amendment and constitutional development through small-c
sources might serve as substitutes, but entrenchment does not have a statistically significant
relationship with mixed or small-c regimes. Moreover, it would also be reasonable to hypothesize
that when the constitution itself contains more detail—or is “code-like”—there is less of a need
to develop constitutional law through other sources.92 But, perhaps surprisingly, we find no
evidence that countries with longer constitutions are less likely to be mixed or small-c regimes.
The first row in Figure 4 shows the results for entrenchment and word count graphically.93

See, e.g., Versteeg & Zackin, Constitutions Un-entrenched, supra note 28; Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Drafting and Distrust,
13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 819 (2015).
92

93

Appendix Table A1-1 shows these same findings in a regression framework.
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Figure 4: Constitutional / Legal Characteristics and Constitution Regime Type

We also find no evidence that the four features of countries’ broader legal system—
common law, rule of law, judicial independence, and democracy—correlate with constitutional
regime types. Perhaps most surprisingly, we find no evidence that common law legal traditions are
a statistically significant determinant of constitutional regime type. Because scholars have often
speculated that judicial interpretations play a special role in the development of common law
constitutions, while civil law constitutions are more code-like,94 it would reasonable to think that
common law systems are more likely to be mixed-regimes. But our data does not support this
hypothesis. Instead, our finding lends support to the claim that the differences between common
law and civil law systems are not nearly as pronounced for constitutional law as they are for other
areas of law.95 We do not find that judicial independence is correlated with having a mixed regime;

94

See, e.g., Thomas Fleiner & Cheryl Saunders, Constitutions Embedded in Different Legal Systems, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2015).

OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Lorraine Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, 84,
89-90 (Sujit Choudhry ed. 2007); ALLAN-RANDOLPH BREWER-CARAIS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW (1989).
95
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respect for the rule of law is correlated with mixed regimes; or democracy is correlated with mixed
regimes. Panels 3 through 6 in Figure 4 show these findings graphically.96
4.2. Legal Bases of small-c Constitutional Rights
Another notable finding from our survey is that judicial interpretations of constitutional
provisions are the most commonly cited legal basis of small-c constitutional rights. Panel A of
Table 2 shows that 94 experts indicated that judicial interpretation are part of the small-c
constitution. That said, treaties are also important: 67 experts identified treaties as a basis of smallc constitutional rights. In addition, 42 experts singled out quasi-constitutional statutes; 38 experts
identified conventions; and 16 experts pointed at common law precedents. And 17 experts noted
there were other legal bases for small-c rights not listed by us. These included: “customary law”
(Malawi); “international custom and principles” (Colombia); “interpretations of ‘regular’ laws”
(Japan); “rights inherent to human beings” (Venezuela); and “the Quaran and the Sunnahs” (Saudi
Arabia).
Table 2: Legal Bases of small-c Constitutional Rights
A. By Experts
B. By Country
#
%
#
%
Judicial Interpretations
94
42.7
59
48.0
Treaties
67
30.5
42
34.2
Conventions
38
17.3
32
26.0
Quasi-Constitutional Laws
42
19.1
31
25.2
Common Law Precedents
16
7.3
10
8.1
Other
17
7.7
15
12.2
Panel B of Table 2 shows the prevalence of each of these legal bases for small-c rights by
country, whereby we consider a country’s recognition of a given small-c source whenever at least
one expert identified it as such. This demonstrates that, in roughly 48% of countries, judicial
interpretations form a legal basis for constitutional rights, followed by treaties (34%),97
conventions (26%), quasi-constitutional laws (25%), and common law precedents (10%). Figure
5 shows the same information on a world map.

96

Appendix Table A1-2 shows these same results using regression analysis.

Table 2 may actually underestimate the importance of treaties, since a number of countries declare certain treaties (usually
international human rights treaties) to be part of the constitution, and we do not know whether experts treated this
approach as treaties being part of the small-c or large-C constitution. If they treated treaties as part of the Large-C
Constitution, this would not be captured here.
97
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Figure 5: World Map of Legal Bases of small-c Constitutional Rights

Another finding is that the majority of experts who said rights were not exclusively found
in the Large-C constitution identified more than one source of small-c constitutional rights.
Specifically, as Table 3 reveals, 83 experts pointed at more than one source, while 5 experts (from
the U.K., Israel, Nicaragua, South Sudan, and Uganda) identified 5 or 6 different sources.
Table 3: Number of Legal Bases for small-c Constitutional Rights Identified by Experts
# of Bases
1
2
3
4
5
6

# of Experts
53
48
22
7
5
1
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Figure 6: small-c Constitutional Sources by Constitutional Age

We also explored the relationship between legal bases and the same three constitutional
characteristics examined in Part 4.1: (1) the constitution’s age, (2) the constitution’s entrenchment
score, and (3) the constitution’s word count. Of those variables, age is the only one that
consistently has a statistically significant relationship with the prevalence of different legal bases
of small-c rights. Specifically, jurisdictions with older constitutions are more likely to recognize
judicial interpretations,98 conventions,99 laws with quasi-constitutional status,100 and common law
precedents.101 Figure 6, Panels 1, 3, 4, and 5 show these results graphically. Indeed, the only source
not associated with age are treaties (shown in Panel 2), as these are found in younger and older
systems alike.102 It is possible that this results from the fact that Large-C Constitutions are often

98

See Appendix Table A2-1.

99

See Appendix Table A4-1.

100

See Appendix Table A5-1.

101

See Appendix Table A6-1.

102

See Appendix Table A3-1 and Figure 6 Panel 2.
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explicit about the status of international treaties, but not about the other small-c sources.103 We
further find that jurisdictions with older constitutions recognize a larger total number of small-c
sources.104 These findings are consistent with the results in Figure 3 suggesting that older
constitutions are more likely to be associated with mixed constitutional regimes.
We did not find that the constitution’s entrenchment score or length were systematically
associated with particular constitutional regime types. An exception is the relationship between
constitutions’ length and judicial interpretations: in countries with longer constitutions, judicial
interpretations are more likely to play a role.105 This is perhaps somewhat counterintuitive, as one
might expect that constitutions that provide more detail require less interpretation.106 On the other
hand, longer and more detailed constitutional texts might also create ambiguities that need
resolving through judicial interpretation.107 Our findings tentatively provide support for this latter
hypothesis, although it warrants further exploration.
We also examined the same four features of countries’ broader legal systems from Part
4.1: (1) if they have common law systems, (2) their level of respect for the rule of law, (3) their
level of judicial independence, and (4) their level of democratization. Figure 7 depicts the
prevalence of each of the small-c sources among common law and civil law systems. Perhaps most
surprisingly, it reveals that judicial interpretations are just as likely to serve as the legal basis of
small-c constitutional rights in civil law countries as they are in common law countries. This
finding suggests, again, that the importance of the divide might not be as salient for constitutional
law as it is for other areas of law. Likewise, Figure 7 shows that there is no difference in the
prevalence of super-statutes and constitutional conventions among these two different systems.
However, a country’s legal tradition is related to the prevalence of treaties and common
law precedents. Perhaps unsurprisingly, experts from civil law countries were dramatically less
likely to say that common law precedents are a legal basis for small-c constitutional rights: 3% of
experts from civil law countries said common law precedents are a legal basis for rights compared
to 20% for common law countries. More notable is that treaties are more significant as a source
of constitutional law in civil law countries than in common law countries: 40% of civil law experts
indicated treaties to be a legal basis of small-c rights, compared with 23% of common law experts.
This finding likely reflects the fact that civil law countries almost universally possess monist
systems of international law (that is, systems where international treaties apply in the domestic
legal order directly).108 While having a monist systems does not automatically mean that treaties
obtain constitutional status,109 it seems likely that courts and constitution-makers in monist
systems feel more comfortable elevating treaties to constitutional law than those in countries
Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh & Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions
Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 201 (2008); see also Rene Urena, Domestic Application of International Law in
Latin America, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 565, 566-67 (Curt Bradley ed., 2019).
103

104

See Appendix A7-1 and Figure 6 Panel 6.

See Appendix Table A2-1. Appendix Table A3-1 also reveals a relationship between treaties and entrenchment and
word count, but these relationship does not hold up when controlling for other constitutional features.
105

Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 28 (hypothesizing that constitution-makers draft constitutional detail to prevent courts
from changing the meaning of the constitution through interpretation).
106

107

Dixon, supra note 93.

108

See Verdier & Versteeg, supra note 58, at 515-16.

109

In fact, this is a contested question. See Hans Kelsen, Sovereignty and International Law, 48 GEO. L. J. 627 (1960).
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where treaties require incorporation into domestic law. These differences notwithstanding, the
average total number of small-c sources was similar for both types of systems: 1.51 for common
law countries and 1.43 for civil law countries (see Figure 7, bottom row). Taken together, these
findings suggest that the differences between common law and civil law systems in the realm of
constitutional rights are small.
Figure 7: Prevalence of small-c Sources by Common Law / Civil Law Traditions

When examining if the other features of countries’ broader legal systems were associated
with the prevalence of particular small-c sources, our results reveal that these legal characteristics
have little bearing on the nature of the small-c constitution.110 Two notable exceptions are that
countries that are more democratic and countries with more independent judiciaries are
increasingly likely to recognize judicial interpretations as a source of constitutional rights.111
110

These results are presented in Appendix Tables A2-2, A3-2, A4-2, A5-2, A6-2, and A7-2.

111

See Appendix Table A2-2.
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4.3. Specific Rights
In addition to these general questions about constitutional rights, our survey also asked
about twelve specific rights. For 12 different rights, we asked experts whether the rights are
protected in: (1) the Large-C constitution; (2) the small-c constitution; or (3) are not
constitutionally protected at all.112 When analyzing specific rights, we find that the Large-C
constitution becomes even more important. As Panel A of Table 4 shows, for the vast majority
of countries, experts indicated that the right was protected by the Large-C constitution (ranging
from 94% for free speech to 49% for the right to housing). In Panel B of Table 4, we omit the
countries where these rights are not constitutionally protected at all. Doing so reveals that the
importance of the Large-C constitution increases even further, ranging from 95% for free speech
to 72% for the right to housing.
Table 4: Source of Specific Constitutional Rights (% of Countries)
A. All Responses
B. Responses Agreeing
Right Exists
Large-C Small-c No Right
Large-C
Small-c
Free speech
94.0
5.1
0.9
94.8
5.2
Right to form political parties
80.7
13.2
6.1
86.0
14.0
Right to unionize
75.7
17.1
7.2
81.6
18.5
Freedom of religion
92.2
5.2
2.6
94.6
5.4
Freedom of association
91.4
6.9
1.7
93.0
7.0
Gender equality
84.2
11.4
4.4
88.1
11.9
Freedom of movement
86.5
9.0
3.6
89.7
10.3
Prohibition of torture
82.3
14.2
3.5
85.3
14.7
Right to education
83.2
11.5
5.3
87.9
12.2
Right to healthcare
69.6
13.9
16.5
83.3
16.7
Right to housing
49.1
19.1
31.8
72.0
28.0
Right to social security
67.0
17.9
15.2
79.0
21.1
At first glance, these numbers suggest that there is a discrepancy between respondents’
general assessment of the constitution order and their assessment of specific rights, in that the
small-c constitution appears to be more salient for the bill of rights as a whole than for these 12
specific rights. Upon closer inspection, however, this finding might not be so surprising. Notably,
the 12 rights we selected for inclusion in our survey are widely enumerated in written constitutions.
According to Versteeg’s coding of constitutional texts: free speech is found in 96%; the right to
form political parties is found in 65%; the right to unionize is found in 75%; the freedom of
religion is found in 95%; the freedom of association is found in 94%; gender equality is found in
86%; the freedom of movement is found in 89%; the prohibition of torture is found in 86%; the

Note that the numbers may not add to 100% due to rounding. The percentages are calculated after excluding countries
where all respondents did not answer for a specific right or where all respondents answered that they did not know. In
cases of disagreement between experts, we coded the right as being from the small-c constitution if any expert held that
view; if no expert held that view, we coded the right as being from the Large-C constitution.
112
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right to education is found in 82%; the right to healthcare is found in 71%; the right to housing is
found in 42%; and the right to social security is found in 65%.113
For most rights, expert assessments thus tracks the coding of Large-C text fairly closely.
Moreover, once we analyze expert responses across all 12 rights, the expert assessments on specific
rights becomes closer to the general question on the bill of rights as a whole. Specifically, in 69
countries (57%), at least one expert claimed that at least one of the 12 rights was found in the
small-c constitution. For comparison, in their general assessment of the bill of rights, at least one
expert in 46 countries (38%), claimed that the country was mixed or small-c. Overall, it is likely
that experts asked to evaluate the nature of constitutional rights protection in general made a
general assessment of the prevalence of unenumerated rights to classify the bill of rights as a
whole.114
Table 5: Number of small-c rights found in Large-C constitution
# of Countries
# of Same Countries
Experts Reported Coded as Having Right
Source is small-c
in Versteeg Dataset
Free speech
6
4
Right to form political parties
15
1
Right to unionize
19
10
Freedom of religion
6
4
Freedom of association
8
3
Gender equality
13
11
Freedom of movement
11
6
Prohibition of torture
16
7
Right to education
13
8
Right to healthcare
16
8
Right to housing
21
7
Right to social security
20
9
In some cases, we found that experts located a right in the small-c constitution even when
it was explicitly enumerated in the Large-C constitution. Although relatively few experts located
specific rights in the small-c constitution, in 48% of instances where at least one country expert
did so, the right actually also appeared in the Large-C constitution. Table 5 breaks down these
numbers for each right. Table 5 shows that 6 experts said that free speech was found in the smallc constitution, but the constitution explicitly enumerates the right to free speech in 4 of those
countries. Likewise, 13 experts noted that gender equality was found in the small-c constitution,
but the Large-C constitution explicitly enumerates the right to gender equality in 11 of those
countries. The reasons that experts claimed that the source of rights that are enumerated in the
written constitution is actually the small-c constitution warrants probing in future research. The
These numbers use 2016 data from Versteeg’s coding of the constitutional rights in all 194 widely recognized countries.
For more information, see CHILTON & VERSTEEG, supra note 82.
113

Some of the discrepancy might be due to the fact that we framed the question for each of the twelve rights differently
than for the general question. Specifically, we asked respondents whether the right was found in: (1) the Large-C
constitution, (2) the small-c constitution, or (3) not protected at all. We thus provided respondents with a less granular
classification than for the overall questions and forced a choice between Large-C and small-c.
114
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most likely explanation is that, in these countries, even though the right is enumerated in the
written constitution, it is given meaning through the larger body of constitutional law. That is,
even though the right is enumerated, its full scope is not defined in the text but in other
constitutional sources. It might also be the case that experts answered the question without giving
it sufficient thought. It is also possible that experts may have varying conceptions of what it means
for a right to be constitutionally protected when answering such a question.
Conversely, in some instances, experts said that a right was protected in the Large-C
constitution, even though Versteeg’s database does not include it. Such discrepancies may again
reflect error of judgment on the part of the expert, but they may also reflect different
understandings of what it means for a right to be protected in the Large-C constitution. To
illustrate, an Australian expert said that the Large-C constitution protects right to free speech,
even though the Australian Constitution does not contain a free speech provision. Yet, the
Australian High Court has found that free speech is constitutionally entrenched by deriving it
from another constitutional provision (in this case, representative democracy).115 Thus, it is not
unreasonable for the Australian expert to locate free speech in the constitutional text; but it is also
reasonable for Versteeg’s database not to code democracy protections as a right to free speech.
At the same time, in Israel, where the Supreme Court derived free speech from the Basic Law’s
human dignity provision,116 all three experts agreed that the basis for free speech was the small-c
constitution, even though they could have followed the Australian expert’s logic and locate it in
the Large-C constitution (assuming that we can treat the Basic Laws as a Large-C constitution).
Again, such discrepancies merit exploration in future research.
4.4 Expert Disagreement
One important question for a survey like ours is to what extent experts disagree with each
other. If experts provide dramatically different answers, then the nominal approach for identifying
constitutional law may simply not be viable. Our general interpretation of our results is that, for
the most part, experts were able to agree with each other, although agreement was not perfect.
Table 6: Range of Disagreement for Sources of Constitutional Rights by Country
Response Range
# of Countries
% of Countries
0
16
32.0
1
19
38.0
2
14
28.0
3
1
2.0
As a first exploration of this issue, Table 6 shows the range of disagreement for the general
question about the main sources of constitutional rights, on a five-point scale (ranging from
“exclusively” Large-C to “exclusively” small-c), which we analyzed in Panel A of Table 1. Table 6
See Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] HCA 46, (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Aus.); Australian Capital Television v
Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45, (1992) 177 CLR 106 (Aus.) See also Adrienne Stone, The Comparative Constitutional Law of
Freedom of Expression, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 406 (Ros Dixon & Tom
Ginsburg eds., 2013). With the exception of the freedom of association, there were similar responses for every right.
115
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Stone, supra note 115, at 406.
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specifically analyzes the results for the 50 countries of which multiple experts took the survey. It
reveals that, for 16 countries with multiple experts (32%), all experts were in agreement and gave
the same answer. For 19 countries, experts were at most 1 answer apart. Of these 19 countries,
experts agreed that the Large-C constitution was the most important source of constitutional
rights in 9 countries, but stood divided over whether constitutional rights were “primarily” or
“exclusively” found in the Large-C constitution; disagreement was over whether small-c
constitutional rights were “primarily” Large-C or “mixed” in 8 cases. Thus, in these cases, experts
agreed that both the Large-C constitution and small-c sources have a role to play, but stood
divided over whether the Large-C constitution was the primary source.117 For 14 countries, there
was a range of 2 in the responses: Burundi, Cameroon, China, Costa Rica, France, Ghana, Laos,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In these instances,
experts still agreed that the text of the written constitution matters, but disagreement over how
much is more substantial. Finally, in just 1 country, the United States, experts were three responses
apart. There were 7 responses from the U.S., and one expert believed that U.S. constitutional law
was “primarily Large-C” and another believed that U.S. constitutional law was “exclusively smallc.” These two experts, then, were entirely unable to agree whether the written constitution has
any role to play at all. Of the other 5 U.S. experts, 3 responded that America was a “mixed” regime
and 2 responded that the U.S. was “primarily small-c.”
The 14 countries for which experts were two or more points apart merit further
exploration in future research. But since it is possible that these disagreements reflect error in
expert judgement, it is reasonable to downplay the findings for these countries for now. We
therefore replicate our basic findings from Table 1 when excluding these 15 countries and present
the results in Appendix Table A8. The findings reveal that the role of the Large-C constitution
actually increases. Specifically, in Table 1, 62% of countries were coded as Large-C regimes. But
after excluding the 15 counties with disagreement of 2 points or more, this increases to 71%. This
is because, by treating countries where there is disagreement as mixed, we downplayed the
importance of the Large-C constitution.
When we analyze disagreement on the three-point scale (“exclusively or primarily LargeC”; “mixed”; or “exclusively or primarily small-c”), expert agreement increases. For 26 countries,
there was no disagreement; for 23 countries, there was disagreement by one-point on the scale;
and for just 1 country (again, the U.S.), there was disagreement across two-points on the scale.
For the 23 countries with a 1-point disagreement, 18 involved cases where respondents disagreed
over whether the constitution was Large-C or mixed, while in just 1 country (Israel), the
disagreement concerned whether the constitution was mixed or small-c. Taken together, these
findings reveal that most of the disagreement occurs regarding the question of whether the
constitution is Large-C or mixed. In other words, the disagreement is over the extent to which
other sources supplement the constitutional text (with the U.S. as the notable exception).
When we analyze the same question for specific constitutional rights, expert agreement
also increases. Table 7 reports the percentage of countries where multiple experts all agreed on
the source of each specific right (e.g., all said Large-C, all said small-c, or all said the right doesn’t
exist). Table 7 shows that agreement is 75% or higher for 9 of the 12 rights. The rights for which
agreement is lower are those less commonly found in the written constitution: the right to
In one instance, disagreement concerned whether small-c constitutional rights were “mixed” or “primarily” small-c. In
another single instance, disagreement concerned whether the source of constitutional rights was “primarily” or
“exclusively” found in the small-c constitution.
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unionize, the right to housing, and the right to social security. Overall, these findings reveal,
perhaps unsurprisingly, that once a right is enshrined in the constitution, experts are better able
to agree on its source.
Table 7: Agreement on Source of Specific Constitutional Rights
% of Countries
Free Speech
97.8
Right to form political parties
75.0
Right to unionize
69.8
Freedom of religion
100.0
Freedom of association
95.5
Gender equality
81.0
Freedom of movement
81.8
Prohibition of torture
86.4
Right to education
86.7
Right to healthcare
79.1
Right to housing
61.0
Right to social security
70.7
Another way to gauge expert agreement is to explore the extent to which experts agreed on
the different legal bases for small-c constitutional rights. Table 8 shows the number of countries (out
of the 50 with multiple respondents) in which all experts agreed that a particular source was part of
the small-c constitution (that is, all experts said “yes” or “no” when asked whether a particular source
was part of the small-c constitution). It reveals that the most common source, judicial interpretations,
is also the most contested: in only 46% of countries with multiple respondents did the experts agree
that judicial interpretations are a basis for small-c rights. By contrast, agreement is higher for common
law precedents (with 86% of experts agreeing), laws with quasi-constitutional status (58% agreement),
conventions (60% agreement), and treaties (56% agreement).

Table 8: Countries Where All Experts Agreed on Legal Basis of small-c Rights
% of Countries
Judicial Interpretations
46.0
Treaties
56.0
Conventions
60.0
Quasi-Constitutional Laws
58.0
Common Law Precedents
86.0
Other
78.0
A final way to gauge expert agreement is to explore their perceptions of whether other experts
agree with their evaluation. For each of the legal bases of small-c constitutional rights they identified,
we asked experts whether they believed that other experts would agree with them. Here, our findings
reveal that experts’ self-assessment of agreement differs substantially from actual agreement. Notably,
the experts were particularly confident that other experts would agree that judicial interpretations were
a legal basis for small-c rights. Indeed, as Table 9 shows, 91% of experts believed that other experts
would agree that judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions were part of the small-c
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constitution; yet, in reality, only 46% did. Likewise, 88% of experts believed that other experts would
agree that treaties are a source of constitutional law; in reality, only 56% agreed. For less common
sources, however, the gap between self-assessment on agreement and actual agreement became
smaller. For example, 73% of experts believed that other experts would agree that laws with quasiconstitutional status are a source of constitutional law; in actuality, 58% agreed.

Table 9: Experts That Said Other Experts Would Agree with Their Assessment
% of Responses
Judicial Interpretations
91.4
Treaties
87.9
Conventions
73.7
Quasi-Constitutional Laws
73.2
Common Law Precedents
68.8
Other
66.7
Overall, we believe it is fair to say that for most countries, there is a reasonable level of
agreement over the nature of constitutional law. To the extent disagreement exists, it relates to the
extent to which the Large-C constitution is supplemented by small-c sources, not whether the LargeC constitution has a role to play at all. What is more, agreement is larger for broadly framed questions
that relate to the entire bill of rights than for questions more narrowly tailored to specific rights. At
the same time, the level of expert agreement is an important topic for future exploration. It is clear
that agreement is larger in some countries than others, and future research could explore the causes
for uncertainty about the nature of constitutional law.

5. CONCLUSION
Our expert survey yielded several novel insights into the nature of constitutional law across
national jurisdictions, including that Large-C constitutions are relatively important; that the smallc constitution becomes more important as the written constitution matures; and that the common
law/civil law divide has only a limited relationship with the shape and form of constitutional
systems. It is our hope that these findings will help guide future research.
Our findings also raise the question of whether more comprehensive coding of small-c
constitutions is possible. As noted, the specific questions on twelve constitutional rights allow us
to effectively “code” these rights in small-c constitutions for over 100 countries. Further expert
surveys could potentially be employed to more comprehensively quantify small-c constitutions,
thereby enabling Large-N studies of small-c constitutions. But at the same time, some of our
experiences and findings give us some pause about the feasibility of coding small-c constitutions.
While coding small-c constitutions might be possible, our experience with this initial expert survey
reveals several major logistical and methodological challenges that need to be resolved before such
an enterprise could be undertaken in earnest.
First, we learned that the recruitment of experts is difficult. We spent substantial time and
resources identifying and contacting constitutional law experts from different countries. Further,
the response rate was fairly low; roughly 20% of experts responded to our email correspondence.
We are also unsure whether the experts that participated hold views that are representative of
constitutional experts in their respective countries. We acknowledge that they may not be, since
the experts that took our survey all spoke English and, in many cases, have professional
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connections to elite American universities. Future attempts at coding of small-c constitutions
should thus find better ways to identify experts, possibly by compensating them for their time.
Second, we learned that, although expert agreement was not complete, it was perhaps
larger than we had expected. However, any future attempt at coding small-c constitutions should
try to find ways to ensure that experts have similar concepts in mind when answering questions
(for example, by asking anchoring questions and explaining constitutional concepts in detail). It
would also need an estimation strategy to deal with uncertainty, created by the fact that some
experts may hold unrepresentative views or may simply get certain answers wrong.
Third, we found that most experts were unable to answer our historical questions on when
each right first received constitutional protection. It is likely that they did not answer these
questions because doing so would require them to do further research (which was more than we
could ask for in an unpaid survey). But constitutional protections are not static, and evolve over
time. Any future attempt to code small-c constitutions would thus have to find a way to get experts
to evaluate changes in the nature of constitutional protections over time.
Fourth, we acknowledge that we have no insight into whether our findings on
constitutional rights are representative of constitutional law as a whole. Any future attempt to
code small-c constitutions would have to decide which areas of constitutional law to focus on.
Unlike for Large-C coding, it is likely impossible to code small-c constitutions for all areas of
constitutional law in a single project. This is because experts consider themselves knowledgeable
only in certain areas of constitutional law. Yet, if choices need to be made, it is not obvious which
areas of constitutional law are most suited to small-c coding.
Despite these challenges, we believe that a nominal approach which relies on local experts
is the best method for a small-c constitution coding project. Indeed, our findings reveal that
coding small-c constitutions without consulting experts would likely be impossible—most
countries’ constitutions include multiple sources that may be incredibly hard for outside coders to
access and identify. We therefore believe that reliance on experts is necessary, and that making
real progress in coding small-c constitutions will require a team of researchers, substantial time
and resources, and the development of innovative solutions to these problems. A definitive coding
of small-c constitutions may thus remain elusive.
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Small-c Constitutional Rights
Online Appendix
These appendices provides three pieces of additional information on our expert survey. Appendix
1 provides additional analyses and results that were discussed in the body of the manuscript.
Appendix 2 provides the text of the survey instrument. Appendix 3 provides the list of experts
that participated in this research.
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Appendix 1: Additional Results

Table A1-1: Source of Constitutional Rights – Constitutional Variables
(1)
Constitutional Age

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.003
(0.003)

-0.004***
(0.001)
0.009
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.003)

-0.004***
(0.001)

Entrenchment Score

0.009
(0.006)

Constitution Word Count

Observations
121
121
119
R-squared
0.108
0.018
0.012
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Judicial Interpretations as a source of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level

119
0.121

Table A1-2: Source of Constitutional Rights – Legal Variables
(1)
Common Law
Rule of Law

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.009
(0.008)

-0.128
(0.130)
0.364
(0.706)
0.038
(0.604)
-0.013
(0.021)

-0.022
(0.099)
0.102
(0.386)

Judicial Independence

-0.084
(0.156)

Polity Score

Observations
117
78
119
110
R-squared
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.012
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Judicial Interpretations as a source of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level
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75
0.030

Table A2-1: Basis of small-c Rights – Judicial Interpretations – Constitutional Variables
(1)
Constitutional Age

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.007**
(0.003)

0.003**
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.007)
0.007***
(0.003)

0.002**
(0.001)

Entrenchment Score

-0.004
(0.007)

Constitution Word Count

Observations
121
121
119
R-squared
0.033
0.004
0.054
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Judicial Interpretations as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level

119
0.103

Table A2-2: Basis of small-c Rights – Judicial Interpretations – Legal Variables
(1)
Common Law
Rule of Law

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.021***
(0.008)

-0.004
(0.127)
-0.377
(0.690)
0.088
(0.591)
0.020
(0.021)

110
0.066

75
0.044

-0.014
(0.102)
0.226
(0.384)

Judicial Independence

0.447***
(0.156)

Polity Score

Observations
117
78
119
R-squared
0.000
0.005
0.066
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Judicial Interpretations as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level
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Table A3-1: Basis of small-c Rights – Treaties – Constitutional Variables
(1)

(3)

(4)

Constitution Word Count

0.005*
(0.003)

0.001
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.006)
0.004
(0.003)

Observations
121
121
R-squared
0.007
0.034
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Treaties as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level

119
0.030

119
0.058

Constitutional Age

(2)

0.001
(0.001)

Entrenchment Score

-0.013**
(0.006)

Table A3-2: Basis of small-c Rights – Treaties – Legal Variables
(1)
Common Law
Rule of Law

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.012
(0.008)

-0.229*
(0.127)
-0.728
(0.688)
0.003
(0.589)
0.022
(0.021)

110
0.022

75
0.085

-0.174*
(0.096)
-0.211
(0.387)
0.178
(0.152)

Judicial Independence
Polity Score

117
78
119
Observations
0.028
0.004
0.012
R-squared
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Treaties as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level
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Table A4-1: Basis of small-c Rights – Conventions – Constitutional Variables
(1)

(3)

(4)

Constitution Word Count

0.002
(0.002)

0.002**
(0.001)
0.004
(0.006)
0.003
(0.002)

Observations
121
121
R-squared
0.043
0.003
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Conventions as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level

119
0.005

119
0.048

Constitutional Age

(2)

0.002**
(0.001)

Entrenchment Score

0.003
(0.006)

Table A4-2: Basis of small-c Rights – Conventions – Legal Variables
(1)
Common Law
Rule of Law

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.001
(0.007)

0.102
(0.122)
-0.037
(0.661)
-0.296
(0.566)
0.016
(0.020)

110
0.000

75
0.022

0.030
(0.090)
-0.234
(0.360)

Judicial Independence

-0.035
(0.141)

Polity Score

Observations
117
78
119
R-squared
0.001
0.006
0.001
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Conventions as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level
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Table A5-1: Basis of small-c Rights – Quasi-Constitutional Laws – Constitutional
Variables
(1)
Constitutional Age

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.000
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)
0.010
(0.006)
0.002
(0.002)

0.002*
(0.001)

Entrenchment Score

0.008
(0.006)

Constitution Word Count

Observations
121
121
119
R-squared
0.030
0.017
0.000
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Quasi-Constitutional Laws as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level

119
0.030

Table A5-2: Basis of small-c Rights – Quasi-Constitutional Laws – Legal Variables
(1)
Common Law
Rule of Law

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.004
(0.007)

0.052
(0.114)
0.329
(0.619)
0.237
(0.530)
-0.022
(0.019)

0.013
(0.088)
0.147
(0.341)

Judicial Independence

-0.028
(0.140)

Polity Score

Observations
117
78
119
110
R-squared
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.003
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Quasi-Constitutional Laws as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level
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75
0.036

Table A6-1: Basis of small-c Rights – Common Law Precedents – Constitutional
Variables
(1)
Constitutional Age

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.000
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.000
(0.002)

0.002***
(0.001)

Entrenchment Score

-0.001
(0.004)

Constitution Word Count

Observations
121
121
119
R-squared
0.057
0.001
0.000
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Common Law Precedents as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level

119
0.023

Table A6-2: Basis of small-c Rights – Common Law Precedents – Legal Variables
(1)
Common Law
Rule of Law

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.003
(0.004)

0.218***
(0.067)
-0.202
(0.364)
0.102
(0.311)
-0.006
(0.011)

0.176***
(0.052)
-0.163
(0.207)

Judicial Independence

-0.006
(0.085)

Polity Score

Observations
117
78
119
110
R-squared
0.091
0.008
0.000
0.006
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = 1 if country is coded as having Common Law Precedents as a basis of small-c rights
-- Unit of observation is the country level
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75
0.143

Table A7-1: Basis of small-c Rights – Total Sources – Constitutional Variables
(1)
Constitutional Age

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.012
(0.008)

0.005
(0.004)
0.005
(0.020)
0.014*
(0.008)

0.006**
(0.003)

Entrenchment Score

-0.004
(0.019)

Constitution Word Count

Observations
121
121
119
119
R-squared
0.033
0.000
0.021
0.039
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = is the total number of legal basis (e.g. judicial precedents, treaties, conventions, quasi-constitutional laws,
common law precedents, and “other”)
-- Unit of observation is the country level

Table A7-2: Basis of small-c Rights – Total Sources – Legal Variables
(1)
Common Law
Rule of Law

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.019
(0.023)

0.088
(0.367)
-1.730
(1.992)
0.303
(1.704)
0.037
(0.060)

0.112
(0.287)
-0.579
(1.077)

Judicial Independence

0.531
(0.450)

Polity Score

Observations
117
78
119
110
75
R-squared
0.001
0.004
0.012
0.007
0.027
-- OLS estimates with standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-- DV = is the total number of legal basis (e.g. judicial precedents, treaties, conventions, quasi-constitutional laws,
common law precedents, and “other”)
-- Unit of observation is the country level

42
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490919

Table A8: Source of Constitutional Rights – Excluding Countries
with Large Disagreement

Exclusively Large-C
Primarily Large-C
Mix
Primarily small-c
Exclusively small-c

A. By Expert
#
%
56
34.8
61
37.9
37
23.0
3
1.9
4
2.5

B. By Country
#
%
75

70.8

27

25.5

4

3.8

This table recreates Table 1, but excludes the responses of experts from countries with
disagreements of 2 points or greater based on the approach used in Table 6.
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Appendix 2: Text of the Survey Instrument
Expert Survey on Constitutional Rights Protection
As a constitutional law expert, we want to ask you a few questions on constitutional rights
protections in your country. This survey will take roughly 10 to 30 minutes of your time.
We know that your time is valuable, so we will acknowledge the experts that help us by completing
this survey in two ways. First, we will include a list of the experts that complete this survey in an
appendix of the book we are currently writing on the effectiveness of constitutional rights (if you'd
prefer, you can complete the survey and choose not to have your name listed). Second, we are
building a website that will make the data from this survey, and our other data on constitutional
rights, publicly available. We will acknowledge all the experts that complete this survey on a page
of experts on that website (we will follow up by email to collect the necessary biographical
information for everyone that completes the survey).
If you have any questions about this research, you can either email us or contact the University of
Chicago Institutional Review Board by email (sbs-irb@uchicago.edu) or phone (+1-773-8347835).
Thank you for taking the time to help with this research.
- Adam & Mila
Adam Chilton
University of Chicago Law School
adamchilton@uchicago.edu

Mila Versteeg
University of Virginia School of Law
versteeg@virginia.edu
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Background
We are trying to learn about the sources of constitutional rights and their level of protection
around the world. More specifically, we want to know how often rights that are considered
constitutional are not included in a county's written constitution (the "Large-C" constitution),
but are instead found in the larger body of constitutional law (the "Small-c" constitution)
comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super
statutes"), treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution, or conventions.
For instance, in some countries, constitutional rights are found exclusively in the countries written
constitution. In other countries, constitutional rights that were not explicitly enumerated in the
written constitution have been recognized by courts and governments (e.g. the Israeli Supreme
Court has found many rights protection in the human dignity provision of the Basic Law on
Human Dignity and Liberty).
We want to know where most rights protections are found in your country.
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Personal Information
Q3A
Before getting started, we need a little information about you and the country you are taking the
survey for.

o Name (1) ________________________________________________
o Title (2) ________________________________________________
o Institution (3) ________________________________________________
o Email (4) ________________________________________________
Q3B
We plan to acknowledge the names of the experts who participate in this survey in an appendix
and the website we are creating on constitutional rights. We will follow up via email for your
biographical information. If you would prefer, we can keep your name confidential.

o Keep my name confidential (1)
o Include my name in the list of experts (2)
Q3C
Please select the country you are taking the survey for.
▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (195)
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Source of Constitutional Rights
Q4A
What is the legal source of constitutional rights in [Your Country]? Please answer on a scale from
1 (exclusively the Large-C constitution) to 5 (exclusively the "Small-c" constitution).

o 1. Exclusively the Large-C Constitution The rights that are considered constitutional
are exclusively enumerated in the written constitution. (1)

o 2. Primarily the Large-C Constitution The rights that are considered constitutional are
primarily enumerated in the written constitution—but there are exceptions. (2)

o 3. A Mix of Large-C Constitution and Small-c Constitution The rights that are

considered constitutional are found roughly equally in the written constitution and the larger
body of constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (3)

o 4. Primarily the Small-c Constitution The rights that are considered constitutional are

primarily found in the larger body of constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial
interpretations, laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been
incorporated into the constitution, or conventions—but there are exceptions. (4)

o 5. Exclusively the Small-c Constitution The rights that are considered constitutional
are exclusively found in the larger body of constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial
interpretations, laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been
incorporated into the constitution, or conventions. (5)
Display the following questions unless respondents answered “Exclusively Large C”.
Q4B Please provide examples of rights that are considered constitutional rights in [Your Country]
that are found in small-c constitution.
________________________________________________________________
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Q4C
For the constitutional rights that are found in the Small-c constitution, what is the primary legal
basis of those rights? Feel free to select more than one option if appropriate.

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6)
o ________________________________________________
Q4D
Do most constitutional law scholars consider Judicial Interpretations of Express
Constitutional guarantees to be part of constitutional law in [Your Country]?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q4E
Do most constitutional law scholars consider Common law precedents to be part of
constitutional law in [Your Country]?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q4F
Do most constitutional law scholars consider Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super
statutes" or laws that implement constitutional guarantees) to be part of constitutional law
in [Your Country]?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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Q4G
Do most constitutional law scholars consider Treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution to be part of constitutional law in [Your Country]?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q4H
Do most constitutional law scholars consider Conventions to be part of constitutional law in
[Your Country]?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q4I
Do most constitutional law scholars consider the "Other" source you entered to be part of
constitutional law in [Your Country]?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q4K
Would you say the government of [Your Country] generally respects the constitution’s rights
provisions?

o No (i.e. constitutional rights are usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. constitutional rights are sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. constitutional rights are almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Twelve Specific Rights
We are going to end by asking you few questions about twelve specific constitutional rights.
Please answer all questions even if [Your Country] does not have one of the rights in it's
constitution. (In other words, we would like to know whether a country respects the right to
unionize, even if the right to unionize is not found in a given country's constitution.)
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Freedom of Expression
Example: "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference." -- Constitution
of Nigeria (Art. 39)
Q6A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Expression in [Your
Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is the written
constitution. (1)

o The Right is not in the Large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (2)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (3)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (4)
Q6B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Expression
is the Small-c Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional
right to Freedom of Expression?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or
constitutional guarantees) (3)

laws that implement

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q6C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Freedom of
Expression as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q6D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Freedom of Expression was
first protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q6E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Freedom of Expression, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Q6F
Does the government generally respect the right to Freedom of Expression?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
Q6G
Have courts enforced the right to Freedom of Expression based on either the large-c
constitution or small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these
rights based on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Political Parties
Example: "All citizens shall have the right to participate in peaceful political activity intended to
influence the composition and policies of the Government. All citizens shall have the right to
form and join political parties and; subject to such qualifications prescribed by law as are
necessary in a democratic society to participate in the conduct of public affairs, whether directly
or through freely chosen representatives.”
-- Constitution of Namibia (Art. 17)
Q7A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Political Parties in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the Large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (14)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (13)
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Q7B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Political Parties is the
Small-c Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right to
Political Parties?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
Q7C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Political
Parties as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q7D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Political Parties was first
protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q7E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Political Parties, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Q7F
Does the government generally respect the right to Political Parties?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
Q7G
Have courts enforced the right to Political Parties based on either the large-c constitution or
small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based
on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Right to Unionize
Example: "The Constitution guarantees all persons: . . . The right to unionize in the cases and
manner provided by the law. Trade union membership shall always be voluntary."
-- Constitution of Chile (Art. 19)
Q8A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Unionize in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the Large-C constitution, but is is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q8B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Unionize is the Small-c
Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right to
Unionize?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q8C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Unionize as
constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q8D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Unionize was first protected
through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q8E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Unionize, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q8F
Does the government generally respect the right to Unionize?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)

58
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490919

Q8G
Have courts enforced the right to Unionize based on either the large-c constitution or small-c
constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based on
sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Freedom of Religion
Example: "Everyone has the freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.”
-- Constitution of Turkey (Art. 24)
Q9A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Religion in [Your
Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status ("super statutes"), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q9B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Religion is
the Small-c Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right
to Freedom of Religion?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q9C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Freedom of
Religion as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q9D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Freedom of Religion was first
protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q9E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Freedom of Religion, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q9F
Does the government generally respect the right to Freedom of Religion?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Q9G
Have courts enforced the right to Freedom of Religion based on either the large-c constitution
or small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based
on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Freedom of Association
Example: "Every person has the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose.”
-- Constitution of Ethiopia (Art. 31)
Q10A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Association in [Your
Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q10B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Association
is the Small-c Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional
right to Freedom of Association?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q10C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Freedom of
Association as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q10D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Freedom of Association was
first protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q10E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Freedom of Association, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q10F
Does the government generally respect the right to Freedom of Association?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Q10G
Have courts enforced the right to Freedom of Association based on either the large-c
constitution or small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these
rights based on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Freedom of Movement
Example: "Every person has the right to freedom of movement.”
-- Constitution of Kenya (Art. 39)
Q11A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Movement in [Your
Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasi-
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constitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q11B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Freedom of Movement is
the Small-c Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right
to Freedom of Movement?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or
constitutional guarantees) (3)

laws that implement

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
Q11C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Freedom of
Movement as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q11D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Freedom of Movement was
first protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________

67
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490919

Q11E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Freedom of Movement, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q11D
Does the government generally respect the right to Freedom of Movement?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
Q11F
Have courts enforced the right to Freedom of Movement based on either the large-c
constitution or small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these
rights based on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)

68
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490919

Gender Equality
Example:
"Men
and
-- Constitution of Germany (Art. 3)

women

shall

have

equal

rights.”

Q12A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Gender Equality in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
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Q12B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Gender Equality is the
Small-c Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right
to Gender Equality?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
Q12C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Gender
Equality as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q12D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Gender Equality was first
protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q12E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Gender Equality, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
70
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490919

Q12F
Does the government generally respect the right to Gender Equality?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored the government) (3)
Q12G
Have courts enforced the right to Gender Equality based on either the large-c constitution or
small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based
on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Prohibition of Torture
Example: "No person shall be subject to torture or inhuman degrading punishment or other
treatment.”
-- Constitution of Gambia (Art. 21)
Q13A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional prohibition of Torture in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q13B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional prohibition of Torture is the Smallc Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional prohibition
of Torture?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q13C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the prohibition
of Torture as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q13D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the prohibition of Torture was first
protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q13E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional
prohibition of Torture, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q13F
Does the government generally respect the prohibition of Torture?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Q13G
Have courts enforced the prohibition of Torture based on either the large-c constitution or smallc constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based on
sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Education
Example: "Every citizen shall have the right to education.”
-- Constitution of Mali (Art. 16)
Q14A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Education in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q14B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Education is the Small-c
Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right to
Education?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q14C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Education as
constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q14D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Education was first protected
through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q14E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Education, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q14F
Does the government generally respect the right to Education?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Q14G
Have courts enforced the right to Education based on either the large-c constitution or small-c
constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based on
sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Health Care
Example: "Every citizen is entitled to health and to comprehensive health care with quality
criteria. The state guarantees to maintain and support public health facilities that provide health
services to the people, and work on enhancing their efficiency and their fair geographical
distribution.”
-- Constitution of Egypt (Art. 18)
Q15A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Health Care in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q15B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Health Care is the Small-c
Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right to Health
Care?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q15C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Health Care as
constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q15D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Health Care was first protected
through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q15E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Health Care, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q15F Does the government generally respect the right to Health Care?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Q15G Have courts enforced the right to Health Care based on either the large-c constitution or
small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based
on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Housing
Example: "The public authorities shall promote the right of everyone to housing and the
opportunity to arrange their own housing.”
-- Constitution of Finland (Section 19)
Q16A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Housing in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q16B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Housing is the Small-c
Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right to
Housing?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q16C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Housing as
constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q16D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Housing was first protected
through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q16E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Housing, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q16F
Does the government generally respect the right to Housing?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Q16G
Have courts enforced the right to Freedom of Housing based on either the large-c constitution
or small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based
on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Social Security
Example: "The State shall care for the social security of the working people, as specified by law.”
-- Constitution of Greece (Art. 22,)
Q17A
What is the main legal source of the constitutional right to Social Security in [Your Country]?

o The Right is in the Large-C Constitution This constitutional right is in the written
constitution. (9)

o The Right is not in the large-C Constitution, but it is in the Small-c Constitution

This right is not in the written constitution, but this right is part of the larger body of
constitutional law comprised of sources like judicial interpretations, laws with quasiconstitutional status (“super statutes”), treaties that have been incorporated into the
constitution, or conventions. (10)

o Not Applicable There is no such constitutional right in [Your Country]. (11)
o I Don't Know I'm not sure if this is a constitutional right. (12)
Q17B
You answered that the main legal source of the constitutional right to Social Security is the Smallc Constitution. What is the primary legal source that establishes the constitutional right to Social
Security?

o Judicial interpretations of express constitutional guarantees (1)
o Common law precedents (2)
o Laws with quasi-constitutional status ("super statutes" or

laws that implement

constitutional guarantees) (3)

o Treaties that have been incorporated into the constitution (4)
o Conventions (5)
o Others, please specify: (6) ________________________________________________
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Q17C
Do you think most constitutional lawyers in your country would regard the right to Social
Security as constitutional law?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q17D
If possible, can you name the Year (e.g. "1965") that the right to Social Security was first
protected through the small-c constitution?
________________________________________________________________
Q17E
If there is anything else you would like to tell us about the small-c basis for the constitutional right
to Social Security, please enter it below.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Q17F
Does the government generally respect the right to Social Security?

o No (i.e. the right is usually ignored by the government) (1)
o Somewhat (i.e. the right is sometimes ignored by the government) (2)
o Yes (i.e. the right is almost never ignored by the government) (3)
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Q17G
Have courts enforced the right to Social Security based on either the large-c constitution or
small-c constitution in [Your Country]? Please do not include enforcement of these rights based
on sources that are not considered constitutional in nature in your answer.

o Never (1)
o Rarely (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Often (4)
o Very Often (5)
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Appendix 3: List of Experts
Country

Expert

Affiliation

Afghanistan

Ghizal Haress

American University of Afghanistan, Department of Law

Albania

Adea Pirdeni

University of Tirana, Faculty of Law

Algeria

Abdesselam Salmi

Ajman University, UAE

Andorra

Marcin Łukaszewski

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Angola

Alexandre Pegado

Alexandre Pegado & Associados Sociedade De Advogados, R.L.

Angola

Flavio Inocencio

Nova School of Law

Argentina

Juan Martín Morando

Argentina

María Lorena Schiariti

Marval, O'Farrell & Mairal

Armenia

Armen Mazmanyan

Central European University

Australia

Rosalind Dixon

UNSW

Austria

Konrad Lachmayer

Sigmund Freud University Vienna

Bangladesh

Ridwanul Hoque

University of Dhaka and La Trobe University

Belgium

Jurgen Goossens

Ghent University and Erasmus University of Rotterdam

Belgium

Ronald Van Crombrugge

KU Leuven

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Maja Sahadzic

University of Antwerp

Botswana

Kago Rapula Mokotedi

Botswana Public Employees Union

Brazil

Bruno Bodart

Harvard Law School; Rio de Janeiro State University

Brazil

Daniel Capecchi Nunes

Federal University of Juiz de Fora

Brazil

Fernando Barboza Dias

University of Virginia

Brazil

Filippo Maria Lancieri

University of Chicago Law School

Brazil

Gabriel Dias Marques da Cruz

Federal University of Bahia (UFBA, Brazil)

Brazil

José Borges Teixeira Júnior

Federal University of Espírito Santo State

Brazil

José Eduardo Figueiredo de
Andrade Martins

Pontifical Catholic University of Campinas

Brazil

Luiz Guilherme Marinoni

Universidade Federal do Paraná

Brazil

Mariana Almeida Kato
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